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TRANSCRIPT OF THE IX NLSIR
SYMPOSIUM ON "GOODS AND
SERVICES TAX: THE CHANGING FACE
OF FISCAL FEDERALISM IN INDIA'

I. SESSION I: CONSTITUTIONAL
CHALLENGES AND CONCERNS
The opening session of the Symposium began with a framework presentation
by Mr. Aradhya Sethia, a IVth year student of National Law School of India
University, Bangalore. The framework presentation foregrounded the debate on
the constitutionality of the 122nd Constitution (Amendment) Bill, 2014 (hereinafter
"the GST Bill"). He divided this inquiry into three sections-first, an identification of the broad values that have been envisaged under the GST Bill and the
status of those values under the Constitution; second, the alleged conflict between
the GST Bil and the Basic Structure of the Constitution, and consequently, third,
whether, if passed, the Bill can be deemed to be in contravnetion of the Basic
Structure. Mr. Sethia also noted that the Bill incorporated provisions (in Clauses
18 and 19) which would not amend the Constitution. He noted this drafting peculiarity and questioned the validity of these clauses.
The first panel speaker was Mr. N. Venkatraman. He organised his exposition by framing three questions: (1) What is wrong with the present idirect tax
regime? (2) What does the GST attempt to do? (3) What constitutional issues
resultantly arise? With respect to the first question, he began by describing the
structures of, and differences between, the direct tax and the indirect tax regime.
Whereas Customs, Excise, Service tax, and Central Sales Tax are levied by
the Union government, states only have monopoly over intra-state sales (VAT).
Consequently, the Central Government's taxing powers currently greatly outweigh that of the states. In this context, he highlighted two major issues: the classification of transactions into 'sales transactions' and 'service transactions', and
the problem of classification of a sales transaction as 'inter-state' or 'intra-state'.
In his opinion, the nebulous nature of the two classifications is the primary cause
of the high rate of pendency in courts and tax tribunals.
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Mr. Venkatraman used two situations to exemplify his point. First, while
identifying a transaction as a sale or service, he referred to transactions relating to intangible rights such as copyright and trademark. If one granted the right
to use for say, five years, the Constitution would declare it a sale under Article
366(29A). On the other hand, if he retained the right to use, but allowed permissive use by various people, granting them limited rights, such that rights are not
conferred exclusively on any person, then that transaction would only by subject
to service tax. Due to the subtlety of the distinction, the same transaction is frequently taxed as both sale and service.
Second, Mr. Venkatraman referred to entry tax for online transactions, most
of which are inter-state. He noted that the advantage of e-commerce is that if one
makes purcahses locally, the transaction will be subject to VAT; if the purchase
is inter-state, then customers save money (as rate of sales tax is only 20o). This
results in a 'tax war' where the online seller has an advantage. In an attempt
to protect local dealers, various states have attempted to tax these transactions
through the levy of entry tax. For example, if the local rate is 5.5% and import
rate is 4%, states impose entry tax of 1. 5 % so that it matches the local rate. He
referred to Constitution bench judgments which have upheld this sort of taxation. The problem arises here because in some states, in case of an inter-state sale
through a physical dealer, the transaction is not subject to entry tax, however, if
the transaction were virtual, entry tax liability is attracted. In his opinion, this
situation was primafacie absurd.
Mr. Venkatraman argued that these absurdities are capable of resolution by the
introduction of the GST regime, which would integrate and subsume all extant
systems of taxation. He explained the proposed dual levy (of CGST and SGST),
and stated that it was a major leap that would integrate both goods and service
transactions. It does so by removing the relevance of the distinction between
goods and services in law and by providing for the joint exercise of powers of
taxation by the states and the union, which, he asserted, was an extremely progressive step. He referred to the proposal to introduce a new article - Article
246A - which uses the phrase "goods and services tax", and empowers both the
Union and State to concurrently tax. Mr. Venkatraman drew a delicate distinction between 'concurrently' and 'simultaneously'. In case of the latter, it means
that both the Centre and the states have power to carry out an activity, and can
do so at the same time. In case of the former however, the Centre and the State
need not exercise of power at the same time, although both are so empowered.
In the case of simultaneous exercise, there can be no conflict. In the case of
concurrent exercise of power, conflict leads to the predominance of the Centre.
Mr. Venkatraman stated that this distinction is very important and is the reason
behind the decision to not incorporate GST into List III in the VII Schedule of
the Constitution. Article 246A, instead of referencing any list, grants both the
State and the Centre simultaneous powers of taxation. He pointed out that this

VOL. 28

TRANSCRIPT OF THE IX NLSIR SYMPOSIUM ON "GOODS & SERVICES TAX 145

grant of the 'power of taxation' was different from 'field of taxation', which finds
place in the VII Schedule.
Finally, Mr. Venkatraman discussed the GST Council, which has been granted
constitutional status (unlike the empowered committee, which was merely an
advisory body). He directed attention to the differential voting power granted: 1/3
to the Union, and 2/3 to the states and to the fact that the decision of the GST
Council would only be recommendatory. Mr. Venkatraman argued that making
the decision recommendatory was an unnecessary compromise, and that even if
the Council's decisions had been granted mandatory status, the basic structure
of the Constitution would not be impugned. He substantiated this by pointing to
the space provided for the states to participate and mold decision making. In his
opinion, this constituted a sufficient protection of fiscal federalism. He finished
his speech on a progressive note, calling for a national, rather than parochial,
approach to fiscal and economic policies.
The second panelist was Mr. Sudhir Krishnaswamy. He began by discussing
the issue of fiscal federalism, which in his opinion, does not find support anywhere in the Constitution. While it may find articulation in the work of constitutional bodies, as well as the support of the principles of equity and efficiency
such as under Article 280, Mr. Krishnaswamy argued that it was not a constitutional principle. In his mind, it could only be considered as an institutional principle, or as a way of organising vertical (centre-state) and horizontal (state-state)
relationships. Mr. Krishnaswamy then elaborated the core norms of fiscal federalism as an institutional principle.
These norms entail, first, that the power to tax and collect revenues must follow functions allocated to the tier of government. This is described as 'form
follows function', a doctrine which he finds surprisingly absent from Indian discourse. He noted that stakeholders in Indian polity have not asked why one tier
of government is granted certain fields of taxation. Even though decentralisation
is projected as a desirable policy, he pointed out how this has heretofore been
restricted to administration alone; taxes are not decentralised. Therefore, although
the local government carries out a lot of core functions important to the citizenry,
it collects the least amount of tax.
Second, Mr. Krishnaswamy referred to fiscal balance as a virtue of fiscal federalism. There must be a vertical balance between federal and state units, as well
as a horizontal balance between states. Although balance is often used synonymously with parity, this does not translate in India to equal sharing of revenue
between the Centre and the states or to states receiving per-capita equal amounts
of revenue. Mr. Krishnaswamy argued that in India, we have struggled with
the horizontal dimension. While reports, such as the last Financial Commission
Report, have spent a lot of time on the vertical dimension, they barely focus on
the horizontal dimension. Mr. Krishnaswamy pointed out that the GST Bill also
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does not address this adequately, particularly given the legal uncertainty regarding Clauses 18 and 19 of the GST Bill.
Third, fiscal federalism is also concerned with equity and efficiency. Mr.
Krishnaswamy began by describing how the GST system envisages equity not
only between states, but also equity in terms of an overall lower incidence of tax,
which would be good for all sections of society. He argued that the GST Bill does
not capture this adequately. The resulting regional disparities in revenue collection, which will become very visible under the GST regime, could have significant impacts on nation-building efforts. He referred to Canada, which, post-GST
reforms, had to deal with an intensification of the secessionist movement in
Quebec. He felt that constitutional lawyers should help expand the debate, and
move from a purely market-based approach to one that also takes into account
political forces.
Mr. Krishnaswamy also noted certain other lacunae in the draft of the GST
Bill. First, he argued that Mr. Venkatraman's thesis on the distinction between
'concurrent' and 'simultaneous' exercise of power stems not from Article 246 but
from Article 248 of the Constitution. Mr. Krishnaswamy stated that this distinction being drawn was the most plausible explanation of the strange blurring of
lines between the source of taxing power and the field of taxation by the GST
Bill. Regardless, Mr. Krishnaswamy posited the belief that it is Article 248 that
requires amending.
Second, he examined the Clauses 18 and 19 of the GST Bill, which, without
amending the text of the Constitution, have substantive legal outcomes and affect
rights and obligations. As an amending act, Mr. Krishnaswamy stated that the
GST Bill has no independent force over and above changes to the Constitution.
Therefore, once the Bill is passed, and the amendments to the Constitution made,
the validity of Clauses 18 and 19 may be highly questionable.
Third, regarding the need for the GST Council, Mr. Krishnaswamy argued
that unlike other constitutional dispute resolution bodies such as the National
Development Council, the GST council had a specified decision making process.
Mr. Krishnaswamy raised the question as to why this was so, and why the decisions were to be only recommendatory. Finally, he questioned the exclusion of the
judicial review of these decisions.
The third panelist was Mr. Alok Prasanna Kumar. He began by examining
the right of states to levy taxes. He stated that under the Indian constitutional
scheme, the states were not mere appendages to the Centre, but are sovereign in
their own fields of taxation, and that while fiscal federalism may not be a part
of the Basic Structure, 'federalism' certainly was. Therefore, clear demarcations
of power, a principle essential to federalism, were necessary. Under the Indian
constitutional design, states were meant to have the power to tax simultaneously.
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Consequently, the distinction between 'concurent' and 'simultaneous' assumes
importance.
Mr. Kumar then chose to focus on some key issues with the constitution and
functioning of the GST Council. First, the 2009 version of the GST Bill had
stated that the Council would recommend based on consensus. The 2014 Bill on
the other hand envisages decisions by majority vote. Where decision is by consensus, there is a role of state governments, however, under the present scheme
he higlighted that it appears that the states would be "bound" by the majority
decision. He then questioned whether this would indeed be a recommendation or
in fact a decision. He pointed out how the Bill itself is unclear because it uses
the word 'decision' in the beginning of the Bill, but subsequently uses 'recommendation' under Article 269A and in Clause 18. In his view, it appeared that
the GST Council would arrive at a 'decision'. This is based on the fact that the
Bill envisages the potential of disputes between the Centre and the states. If the
GST Council was only making recommendations that would not be binding on
the states, then the question of disputes would not arise. On that basis, he argued
that the word 'recommendation' was a reflection of an overshight in drafting.
The second issue pointed out by Mr. Kumar is the manner in which the GST
Council would take said decisions. He referred to the combination of the grant
of 1/3rd votes to the Centre, and the requirement of 3/4 majority to show how the
Centre by definition can never be in the minority. This effectively grants it a veto
right. Mr. Kumar argued that the standing committee on GST has not examined
this at all, although he approved the dissenting note by Navneetha Menon.
Third, Mr. Kumar pointed out how the states have no remedies against the
decision of the Centre emerging out of the GST Council. He stated that as per the
statements of the Centre, the states cannot find redressal even under Article 131.
This, according to Mr. Kumar, significantly affects federalism, potentially even
harming the basic structure of the Constitution.
He concluded his presentation by stating that although a strong case may be
made out in favour of GST, the issues in implementation that it poses are serious. In its current form it institutionalises an adversarial relationship between
the Centre and the states, which would only further a pernicious trend in such
relations.
After the conclusion of Mr. Kumar's speech, panelists responded to each
other's presentations. Mr. Venkatraman addressed the question of fiscal federalism raised by Mr. Krishnaswamy. Stating that fiscal federalism was a constitutional guarantee, Mr. Venkatraman referred to Part XIII of the Constitution,
which disallows fiscal barriers or tariff walls. Withal, responding to Mr. Kumar,
Mr. Venkatraman argued that the GST or the GST Council was not capable of eroding the power of states. Taking a more optimistic political view, Mr.
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Venkatraman argued that federalism would not be eroded by the functioning of
the GST Council. He also argued that the shift to a destination-based taxation
system might disincentivise state investments in infrastructure and states may not
as actively encourage production within its territory. Finally, on the issue of judicial review, he pointed out that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 could never be
barred, given the decision of the Supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar v. Union
of India'. Taking the example of the GST Council, he pointed out how while the
decision itself may not be capable of challenge, the decision-making process was
always assailable. He concluded his speech by arguing that a Centre-heavy GST
Council is desirable as it would promote an unified economic policy, which is
suitable for acclerated economic development.
Mr. Sudhir Krishnaswamy had three responses. First, he argued in favour of
cooperative federalism, which he feels is uniquely valuable for the democratic
process. Second, he stated that partisanship or an adversarial approach is in fact
desirable in the GST Council. From the early 2000s, the debates on GST have
been based on partisanship, and that is the very foundation on which the empowered committee system worked. He believed that the process of give and take that
this resulted in was to be independently valued. Third, he reiterated his point on
fiscal federalism. While some aspects of it (such as in Chapter XIII) may find
resonance in the Constitution, its core values have not been constitutionalised.
Mr. Kumar restricted his response to two issues. First, he stated that given
the vast differences in development goals that different states have, a consensus-based approach to the GST Council's decision making process would be
ideal. Second, on the question of unified economic policy, he referred to the statement of Mr. Y.V. Reddy that states are ultimately equipped with the best understanding of their fiscal situation. He concluded by stating that any GST regime
needs to have more respect for the federal structure.
II. SESSION II: UNDERSTANDING
THE DUAL GST SYSTEM
The second session of the Symposium was intended to examine the possible
issues that may arise as part of a system of dual levy and collection under the
GST regime. Mr. Alok Prasanna, the moderator, opened the session on the Dual
System or 'System of Simultaneous Taxation' by raising three primary issues:
first, what would the implications of this proposed Dual System on the taxation
regime in India be; second, how would the exclusion of goods such as petroleum
products and alcohol, affect the goals/benefits which the GST Bill promises to
achieve; and third, how an input credit taxation system would be introduced and
implemented in the country.
(1997) 3 SCC 261.
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Ms. Mathavi Senguttuvan, a student at the NLSIU, then made a framework
presentation, explaining in brief the various issues to be discussed. She spoke
about how implementation of the proposed Dual GST model in India would be
carried out through the enactment of three categories of taxes: CGST and IGST
by the Central Government and SGST by the State Government. In simple terms,
there would be separate entries showing the imposition of CGST and SGST if
the transaction counted as intra-state supply of goods and services and one entry
showing the imposition of IGST if the transaction was an inter-state supply of
goods and services.
She higlighted that the authority of the Union to levy taxes on goods such as
alcohol, tobacco, and petroleum under the GST Bill was excluded because of the
insistence of states that such products be excluded from the GST dual regime. In
analysing the proposed system as the mirror of the current system, Ms. Mathavi
submitted that the inclusive power of the GST Bill would subsume indirect taxes
such as excise duty, service, central sales tax, VAT, octroi, etc. within it. This
effectively amounts to a rehashing of the existing indirect taxation laws under the
garb of creative nomenclature. Another instance of this 'mirroring' of the present
structure is with reference to the input tax credit mechanism, which will allow
for the setting off of one union tax against another and one state tax against
another.
The first panelist to speak was Dr. Govind Rao. He started off with the history of the GST Bill and how the whole idea of a GST started. It was the Raja
Chelliah Tax Reform Committee of 1991 that first proposed to broaden the tax
base and to include the service sector in the tax net within the VAT System. The
recommendations of the Chelliah Committee were taken forward by Vijay Kelkar
Committee in 2002, which recommended the installation a full-fledged GST in
India.
He considered two primary recommendations. The first was to tax all services
that formed part of the economy and provide credit for goods against services
(and vice-versa), while the second was to give concurrent powers of taxation
to the states, based on 'Place of Supply' rules that take away the power of the
Centre to levy inter-state taxes.
He spoke of how progress on the GST had remained stalled for the last fifteen
years, and of the existence of "a tyranny of the status quo": those who would
gain from reforms were not grateful, and those who would lose out tend to be
vengeful in their opposition. His primary concerns, as he laid out, were to effectively lay out the effects the GST Bill would have on the economy; what sort of
changes it would bring about; and the structure that was likely to emerge out of
the same. To that end, he spoke of how a GST could be equated with a VAT on
goods and services using a destination-based system of taxation, and marvelled
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at the concern for state autonomy in this regard, when no such qualms had been
displayed when VAT itself was introduced.
In a system of taxation, he stated, fiscal autonomy and tax harmonisation
would be permanently conflicting, particularly when one considered the three
costs to minimise. The collection cost, compliance cost and distortions to the
economy could all be positively correlated with variations across the states, with
trade diversions and variations in industrial growth looming. The compromise
would be to introduce a measure of uniformity, while providing certain tax handles to the states.
Apart from the US, most countries in the world have moved over to the GST
model of taxation. Even in the US, discussions on the efficacy of doing so along
with proposals for a Retail Sales Tax that emulates many features of the GST
dominate. However, there was a considerable degree of variation that arose as
regards the level of uniformity and harmonisation that existed across and within
nations, such as Germany, Switzerland, Canada, the EU and Brazil. Australia
for instance, when introducing the GST, reduced state autonomy and determined
taxation and levying through the Commonwealth Grants Commission, bringing
about a degree of harmonisation.
Moving on to a comparative analysis of how GST systems could be implemented, he praised Canada for achieving uniformity and a considerable amount
of harmonisation. However, he did point out differences in how various Canadian
territories acted as regards GST, such as Alberta not levying taxes and relying
only on oil revenue, Quebec having its own traditional VAT mechanism, with
other regions having greater commonalities with each other. Having made these
comparisons, he noted the situation in the EU, which is regarded as inssuficiently
tackling uniformity in that cross-border trade has led to significant problems. No
country within the region had one rate of taxation, except for Denmark. Withal,
he stressed that the example of Brazil ought to cause the greatest caution. Brazil
has a federal GST which discriminates between provinces, and combines an
Origin as well as Destination-based system of taxation, thus affecting both uniformity and harmonisation.
The benefits of a properly implemented GST system would be immense, as it
would simplify the taxation regime, make it more transparent, broaden the tax
base and collection, introduce neutrality via removal of import and export dues,
improve export competitiveness, and create a common market. A Destinationbased system was also spoken of highly, as it would create more responsive and
localised mechanisms, as people in poor states would no longer be taxed, for
instance, on the basis of industrialised Maharashtra's tax regime for goods made
in the latter state.
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Dr. Rao then spoke of the principle of 'separation of taxation', as created by
the Union, State and Concurrent Lists in the Constitution, and emphasised that
these were not to be considered mere economic differentia. As a policy device,
they had been deliberately put into the Constitution, and now the status quo
would mean both the Centre and the States would be unwilling to give up their
power of levying taxes. He spoke of the delay in properly taxing services as an
expansion of the tax base, which in his opinion, was inserted in the Union List
far too late.
He stated that a dual levy of taxes was easily possible, given the current state
of technology, while the objective would be to keep the two systems parallel
without creating undefined interface between them. In his understanding, given
the nature of a transaction, the base price of a product and the CGST on it could
be determined separately from the SGST, and the IGST would anyway combine them and look at the destination of the product concerned to determine the
respective rates.
He then moved on to the issue of goods excluded from the ambit of the GST,
and spoke of alcohol and petroleum products, in respect of which there are specific entries in the Constitution, the power of taxation over which was given to
the States, not the Union. While there could be an excise duty on the consumption of alcohol, a concern over potential sumptuary levies by the states as well as
the effect of continual changes politically, such as the introduction of Prohibition
in various states, would remain.
For petroleum, which has singular value as a revenue item, the states are characterised by various differences arising out of a potential loss of revenue, with
the current variable rate structure allowing for greater control over business and
easy revenue. Therefore, the Bill's response is to treat it differently from other
products with a provision that over a period of time, the GST Council will decide
on the status of a separate duty on petroleum.
Moving on to the question of GST as a potential 'game-changer' with regard
to the economy, Dr. Rao criticised the terms of reference utilised by the 13 th
Finance Commission, which was to look into the potential effects of its levy on
the economy, and the compensation mechanism which had to be developed to
compensate the states for lost revenue. He stated that the Commission assumed
that perfect implementation of the GST would be carried out, relied on insufficient data by looking at the Input-Output Coefficient from 2002-03, which was
before the VAT came in; all of which could help account for the 1.6-2% economic
growth that would be added by the GST Bill. More importantly, such analysis
ought to have been left for when the structure and states' agreement could be
reliably known, for without both, looking into what the tax could do was patently
impractical, and highly speculative.
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Dr. Rao was followed by Ms. Parthasarathy, who highlighted the remarkably
quick evolution of changes to the GST framework. In her opinion, among other
things, the excise duties that existed would change as states would modify their
transfer of property rules depending upon just how taxation was altered. GST,
obviously, would be on the supply of goods or services or both, but transactions
would have to be taxed differently, for example, at the point the transaction was
invoiced.
What would be subsumed under the GST would be key transaction taxes under
Centre and State laws, while customs duties and a wide variety of cesses, surcharges and State taxes would continue right alongside the local levy of municipal taxes. This would create a wide variance in the manner of taxing different
transactions. On the other hand, services such as luxury taxes, Service Tax, VAT
should in fact be subsumed within the law.
The tax rate for GST was intended to be revenue neutral, in that it would not
affect the revenue that was to be earned via the earlier tax system. The original
system proposed a 12% rate, with the Centre getting 5%, and the States getting
7%. While there was some controversy over a report that suggested a revenue
neutral rate (RNR) would entail a 27% rate, it was only one among about 20 simulated rates, with projections based on variations in the goods included within the

GST.
Currently, 18% is seen as a suitable compromise, accounting for variations
in excise, VAT, and various cesses, as well as the ability to arrange for crediting mechanisms. The effective rate of service tax, she stated, would probably
not rise significantly. The 1% tax on inter-state transactions would be, in Ms.
Parthsarathy's opinion, be scrapped or withdrawn. She further stressed that the
market's realities should be accounted for in a multi-tier rate structure, where
essentials would have a 0% tax rate; materials such as bullion and precious metals and gold would be taxed at 1%; and a lower rate for 'almost-essentials', going
up till 18% for certain goods.
With services, on the other hand, a single tax rate is proposed, though the Bill
recognises individual states' power to calibrate and decide their specific rates of
taxation within a narrow band. However, this would still allow for potential rate
arbitrage, and the alteration of distribution and supply chains based on the taxation policy applied to the business. An instance of this could be seen in the current system, where FMCG companies moved to regional warehousing not to be
closer, but due to a 4% CST being levied on inter-state transactions.
Right now, an individual only needs to know the rate in the 'state of origin'.
If this were to be changed to the destination rate is to be taken, one will have
to know the IGST for all conceivable transactions, which would lead to a rise
in compliance costs unless a single IGST rate can be achieved. Other issues are
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diversion of trade (such as by warehousing to avoid CST), labelling and transaction-source manipulation (such as claiming the customer was provided a service
from a corporate office in Delhi rather than Karnataka), which could arise to take
advantage of the variations that may exist as regards IGST and other rates of taxation. She stressed that fiscal autonomy should not come at the cost of business,
given that the current system has been remarkably effective at scaring investors.
She also referred to the planned credit pools, in terms of the CENVAT, the
CENVAT Service Tax and the Central Excise Tax, as well as the benefits of a
centralised compliance mechanism. She regarded the creation of an IGST credit
pool to be of some importance, given the benefits that would flow out of a combination of it and existing systems. The importance of understanding how this
would affect commerce in actuality was emphasised, and the same was illustrated
by how severely this would affect a service provider when compared with the
effect on a manufacturer.
To end her presentation, she spoke of the problem of dealing with the chain
of taxation, and how the GST could perhaps introduce even greater complexity
and the potential for surrounding litigation, given the disparate and multifarious
parties who had to be taken into account. Problems may arise, particularly for
service providers, while contracting with a party with branches across the nation,
in which case Service Tax might be paid in Bangalore, which is also the location
of billing, but for which tax and contract values might have to be determined for
other states.
The next speaker in the discussion was Mr. V Raghuram, who decided to
forego a presentation on the subject in favour of evaluating the discussion on
GST and his contributions to it in the previous 10 years. He began by questioning
whether there was an all-encompassing definition of 'taxation' in the Indian context. He spoke of the ever-expanding scope of Article 366 of the Constitution.
To illustrate this, he spoke of the case of State of West Bengal v. Kesoram
Industries LtcP, which dealt with the issue of whether a State Government could
charge a cess on the royalty that was charged by the Central Government. The
background to the dispute was that of the letting out of mines, in which the centre claimed a royalty. The disputed claim was opposed because of the claim of
the party being charged that the cess would be a tax on an already existing tax.
Four judges of the SC, as part of a 5-judge bench, stated that royalties would
merely constitute a profit share. Justice Sinha, dissenting, stated that the definition of 'tax' in the Constitution was an inclusive one, and that essentially, anything imposed under any statute became a tax, which would render the cess a tax

2
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on a tax and thus inapplicable. This apparently runs contrary to the ratio of the
7-judge bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of TA..
Agreeing with Mr. Rao's circumspect understanding of how much the GST
would change things, Mr. Raghuram spoke of how the change could potentially
expand the bureaucratic hurdles that already surrounded the payment of taxes in
this country, such as a multiplicity of jurisdictions seeking taxes on one particular body or item, and thus scrutinising accounts.
He questioned the Rajya Sabha's purported aim to cover everything that is not
a good under the definition of 'services', and spoke of the possibility of transactions that were neither a good not a service, such as profit transactions such
as the sale of immovable property, and so on. Whether or not such transactions
would be covered by the GST Bill could not be said.
One legislative issue in the Amendment would be the determination of who
had the power to actually fix the rate of taxation. While the GST Council may
provide a rate, the same would remain a recommendation, thus raising the questions of whether the States could move away from such a recommendation, or
refuse to change policies, and so on. If not dealt with suitably, there might exist
a threat of truant State Governments using their own interests to justify a split
from the national effort to have a GST.
The states, as was evidenced by the NEET controversy, are already seeking
to defy the orders of the SC, which created doubts about their future compliance with the decisions of the GST Council. Even assuming everything could be
sorted out as regards the rate, there would remain a question of what in fact was
a good or a service, and whether or not a differential rate would be charged on
the same. For example, delineating the sale of a book from the transmission of
a soft copy of the book over the Web would be needed. In the TCS case, the SC
had held that anything that was capable of abstraction and consumption becomes
a good, and the same need not be tangible to obtain and retain its status as a
good. The UK definition, in this respect, seeks to simplify things, deeming that
any article that undergoes physical sale is a good, and anything sold on the internet is a service, with the rate for sale of goods being different from the rate of
supply of services.
The next problem would be of not having a fixed establishment itself, particularly for B2B transactions and with no finality on transferal. The efficacy of
18% as the RNR Rate still had to be seen, though given that the compensation
planned for the states is intended to cover their losses, it would seem that even
the Centre does not expect the rate to act as such.
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Earlier, the Central Government would stop at manufacturing and at first sale
point, and then transferred control to the states (retailers and distributors were
never under CG control). This would change when the GST comes in, and the
CG will go into every aspect of an economic transaction, and the retailer and
wholesaler will also be under the CG's net.
III. SESSION III: INTEGRATED GOODS

AND SERVICES TAX (IGST)
Ms. Sakhi Shah, a student of NLSIU, Bangalore, began the session with a
framework presentation. She started with a numerical example to explain the
concept of Integrated Goods and Services Tax. The example was of a transaction worth Rs. 100 that originated in Karnataka on which CGST and SGST of
Rs. 10 each was levied. The goods were then sold to a dealer in Maharashtra at
a price of Rs. 200. If the rate of IGST were 20%, then tax levied would be Rs.
40. The credit for IGST can be used to offset both the SGST and CGST liability
in the next stage of the transaction. For instance, if the good is further sold in
Maharashtra, then CGST and SGST will have to be paid but since tax has already
been paid earlier, it can be used as input tax credit. IGST is collected by the
Central Government, and then shared with the state where the final consumption
takes place. It, therefore, prevents a cascading effect, gives revenue to the state
where final consumption occurs, and ensures that there is administrative convenience at low cost.
She then highlighted three issues to be debated in the session. First, sharing
of taxes between the Centre and the states, which is to be covered by the Model
bill on IGST. As per the bill, the onus to collect taxes lies on the Centre, and the
subsequent sharing is to be determined by the Centre-dominated GST Council.
Second, logistical concerns like determining the place of supply of services like
telecommunication services. Third, as a result of the bill, a lack of incentives for
manufacturing states such as Gujarat. Therefore, the Centre advanced a proposal
to allow an additional 1% tax to be given to the relevant manufacturing state.
This then becomes a production tax and not a consumption tax. However, the
GST Council is to determine this, and it is possible that states may not be comfortable with this arrangement.
Mr. P.V. Srinivasan spoke thereafter and started by explaining the pre-GST
regime of taxation for inter-state sales. For the purpose of service tax, which
is a union levy collected and administered by the Centre, the whole of India
except for the state of Jammu and Kashmir constituted a single taxable territory.
Customs duty is also levied by the Centre, which is then apportioned between
states. In the current scenario, these different kinds of taxes do not have a set-off
mechanism for each other. So, VAT, Service Tax, Entry Tax are all taxed more or
less independently.
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He then looked at the taxation system in Europe, where when goods and services are imported, the state into which they are imported, collects tax through
reverse charge mechanism and the state from which they are exported transfers
credit. As a consequence, business benefits but there are issues of cash flow for
the state. Mr. Srinivasan was of the opinion that India did not adopt this approach
since the administration of the GST through this mechanism would be administratively onerous.
He stated that IGST protects a seamless chain of credit. In foregrounding the
IGST, he emphasised two issues: the taxable event and the destination state. In
case of IGST, the taxable event is the supply of goods and services. Currently,
the rate of IGST and its method of taxation have not been outlined in the
Amendment bill. However, citing discussion papers on the subject, he averred
that the IGST rate would amount to the arithmetical sum of CGST and SGST
rates of the destination state. The dealer in destination state will have to collect
the tax levied and transfer it to the government.
To explain further, Mr. Srinivasan made use of an example of a dealer in
Karnataka who sells a pen worth Rs. 100 to another dealer in Maharashtra. Here,
the IGST charged will be according to the Maharashtra schedule to determine
CGST and SGST in Maharashtra. If CGST and SGST in Maharashtra is 10%
each, then the resulting IGST is 20%. The dealer has to be aware that the destination state is Maharashtra and upload his invoice on the GST network stating
this fact. The system will detect the rate of charge in Maharashtra, and accordingly, IGST will be levied and the tax will be apportioned to the state.
However, if the rates of SGST are not uniform across states, IGST for two
states will not be the same. Therefore, IGST could vary from state to state, as
it would depend on the SGST rates applicable in destination states. This further
gives rise to the concern that the GST Bill intended to respond to, that of uniformity in rates of taxation. He suggested that to ensure uniformity in IGST, the
Centre should negotiate with the states to have a Central Schedule that would
specify one singular rate.
He then went on to explain that GST is a value added tax, which means that
the output will be taxed and the amount of input tax can be set-off. The dealer,
therefore, need not segregate the supply that has been made to avail the credit.
IGST output tax can be set-off against IGST input tax too, and the same can
be paid in cash. This input credit may have been accumulated through intrastate supplies as well. The hierarchy of set-off is such that input IGST has to be
used first, then input CGST, then input SGST, while a one-to-one correlation is
not required for each entry. The IGST credit can be used for settling CGST and
SGST too. The order would be that CGST credit could be used to set-off CGST,
and then IGST. Similarly, for SGST credit, SGST is to be used first, and then
IGST. However, CGST cannot be used to set-off SGST, and vice versa.
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All transactions involving an inter-state sale will have to be filed as monthly
returns and subsequently, as annual returns. The GST Network will then make
a settlement for the apportionments to be made to the relevant states. Mr.
Srinivasan informed the audience that no other country is currently using IGST
as a levy for taxes in a federal set-up. He commended the system as a revolutionary that inconveniences no one, preserves the destination system, and has mechanisms for seamless apportionment of revenue. He said that the IGST network, per
se, is a settlement mechanism, rather than a tax collection mechanism.
Additionally, he said that currently for imports into India, Basic Customs Duty
(BCD), Countervailing Duty (CVD) and Special Additional Duty (SAD) are levied. Under the GST Bill, the CVD and the SAD are to be subsumed under the
CGST, while the BCD shall continue to operate independently. This means that
an import will be charged under IGST and the tax liability will be discharged
according to the destination of the import.
He stressed upon the fact that supply, and not sale, was the main event of
concern under the GST. This will be regulated by the 'Place of Supply' Rules,
which will be determined by the Parliament on the recommendation of the GST
Council. The physical location of the goods will determine the place of supply,
and if there is no physical movement of the goods, it will be ascertained on the
basis of constructive delivery. Similarly, where the construction or assembly of
goods takes place will be deemed to be the place of supply. However, determining the place of supply of services is less simple. Therefore, governments evolve
proxies or 'anchors' to determine the place of supply. The recipient's location is
where the supply would be deemed to have taken place. If the place of recipient
is unknown, the location of the supplier or the location of the performance of
services is to be used. Where services are related to an immovable property, the
location of the immovable property would be the place of supply. For telecommunication services, the place of supply could either be the location of the registered number or the place where the person is using the services. However, where
the supplier and the consumer are transient, place of supply would be difficult
to determine. Here, a proxy would again need to be devised for ascertaining the
place of supply. Throughout, he highlighted that the law had not yet matured on
this issue since this would be the first time the state would deal with sub-national
division of services.
After this, Mr. Upender Gupta began his speech with a rebuttal to Ms. Shah's
claim that GST council would ineluctably be biased toward the Centre. He
claimed that GST is based on co-operative federalism. The State and the Centre
would have to participate together. He also added that the budget making process
will undergo a huge change with the introduction of GST. This is so because all
indirect tax proposals are required to be recommended by the GST Council by a
75% majority, with the states having 67% of total voting power. Hence, no indi-

vidual state or all the states put together can carry any proposal through in the
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GST Council. Withal, the same logic applies to the Centre. Hence, only when the
Centre and the state cooperate can they achieve their objectives.
Mr. Gupta then rebutted Mr. Srinivasan's claim about the possibility of different IGST rates in different states. He said the concern would not arise as IGST is
to be levied on imports too. This is so because imports will be treated as interstate supplies irrespective of the state where the import is being made, with the
rate for taxing imports to be decided by the Centre. Therefore, it would be essential to have a single rate of IGST for imports and domestic supplies.
Mr. Gupta also added that, in his mind, IGST would be a third levy and not
just a settlement system between the centre and the states. It is a levy that would
derive power from Article 269A. He then explained the system of classification
of goods and services under the GST system. He explained that the HSN codes
as used under the excise regime would be used under GST as well. The taxable
event would no longer be sale or provision of service, but would instead be the
supply. Further, GST will be an origin based taxed.
The pre-GST system led to huge arbitrage due to the difference in VAT
and CST rates. People preferred showing intra-state sales as inter-state sales.
Although goods would be sold locally, it would be shown that they were sold in
another state.
Mr. Gupta suggested that GST would solve the problems highlighted earlier
due to the following reasons:
First, the taxable event would be supply, which in scope is broader than sale.
It would include every transfer, including stock transfers. In the present system
based on Form F, people open depots in other states and show sales as stock
transfers to avoid paying tax. In a GST regime, IGST will be levied on all interstate transfers. This will ensure that an input tax credit chain is maintained.
Mr Gupta also discussed the additional tax which will be paid to manufacturing states in the initial years to compensate them for the consumption based
nature of the GST. This additional tax is only on goods and would be levied
under the constitutional amendment itself. Mr Gupta also clarified that since no
state is self-sufficient in terms of production, and consumption takes place in all
states, there would be no overwhelming loss or gain to any state.
Mr. Gupta then moved on to give a list of the various models of taxation that
exist around the world like the origin based system, deferred payment system,
and reverse charge mechanism, dual VAT with deferred payment, compensating VAT, viable integrated VAT, prepaid VAT and the split payment method. He
highlighted that the problem with most models is that they treat business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions differently.
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Second, tax is paid by the recipient in these models, and since the supplier is
not paying the taxes, tax payment invariably gets delayed. Some of these models
also mandate that supplies will be zero rated i.e. only taxpayer in Maharashtra
pays tax when he receives the goods or makes the sale for the first time after
having received the goods. The dealer shows local sales as inter-state since there
is no incentive to declare receipts as the dealer will then have to pay tax.
He then moved on to explain the modalities of IGST, which according to him
was the best of the models available to India. First, it would bring about uniform registration. There is already e-registration in five states as of now. Now,
registration will be valid for all activities. Second, there will be a common return
for CGST, IGST and SGST which will show credit utilisation and other details.
Third, there will be common periodicity of returns for a class of taxpayers, i.e., n
number of a class of normal taxpayers, compounding taxpayers, small taxpayers.
After having fixed the periodicity, uniform cut-off dates for filing would be fixed.
While filing the return, all the information including supply and purchase invoice
details would have to be provided. The return will be verified by the system, and
will have to contain the registration number of recipient, and place of supply.
Mr Gupta also discussed the logic behind the hierarchy of set-offs of the IGST,
CGST and SGST. He explained that IGST and CGST are central levies. Hence,
when you allow set-off of central levy only, there are no issues. In cross utilisation, however, there has to be a transfer of funds from the Centre to the state. If
cross utilisation wasn't allowed, SGST would have been payable in cash to the
state. But now, the state will get money only when the Centre will transfer the
relevant amount to the concerned state.
Then he explained the working of IGST in case of Business-to-Consumer supplies through an example. With no input tax credit, a dealer in Karnataka sells
to an individual in Maharashtra. The dealer in Karnataka will pay IGST. He will
declare the place of supply in the return as Maharashtra, but Maharashtra will
get money only when the SGST will be calculated and that amount will then
be transferred to the state. There may be some time lag in payment and in the
availment of credit. Further, Business-to-Business transactions are not eligible to
input tax credit in all supplies, not unlike the CENVAT rules, where transactions
involving sale of mobile phones are not entitled to 100% service tax payment and
credit on taxes. The surplus remaining in the IGST pool will be apportioned in
proportion. Under the IGST model, the rationalisation of the system is enabled
by the fact that the taxpayer simply has to file his return. The funds will not be
transferred on a taxpayer-wise basis, but on a net basis.
Hence, he concluded that the GST was a salutary proposition although a perfunctory understanding might result in the conclusion that the Centre is being
unfairly advantaged. It must be noticed that for services, states get nothing under
the current model. They will now be given a stake in this revenue.
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There are also advantages for the tax administration like up-front tax payments by suppliers in exporting states, no refunds on account of interstate supplies, and a self-monitoring model that secures improved compliance levels.
The session was then opened for questions. The first question was whether
professionals who travel from one state to the other for provision of services,
will also be covered. It was clarified by Mr. Gupta that though doctor would be
exempt, the situation of other professionals like Chartered Accountants going outstation was unclear. Subsequent enactment of rules would thus have to clarify
this.
Another question raised was regarding the relevance of Article 366 (29A)
under the GST. Mr. Gupta suggested that it would be ideal to remove the Article,
as the GST regime only provides for limited exemptions. Further, the Centre will
anyway declare certain services to be deemed services after the passage of the
Act.
This led to another question as to why the exemptions have been provided. Mr
Gupta answered the question by saying that they had an option of a good system
with exemptions or waiting for a perfect system without exemptions. In his mind,
one ought to choose the former.
IV. SESSION IV: PROCEDURAL HURDLES
AND CONCERNS IN IMPLEMENTING GST
Mr. Karthik Ranganathan introduced the four speakers, and the session commenced with Mr. Arbind Modi's speech.
Mr. Modi started by explaining the need for systems of tax administration. He
explained that tax administration systems comprised a set of procedural rules for
voluntary compliance and also to facilitate enforcement. He explained that the
foremost consideration while designing rules should be the optimisation of voluntary compliances, which comes with the lowest administration costs. He stressed
that a poor tax administration can undo the benefits of even the best design tax
policy.
He then went on to raise some key issues of concern with regard to the design
of the GST administration:
First, Registration: He indicated that multiple registrations for the purpose of
GST may lead to complications and also increase the cost of compliance for the
tax payer. This may also give rise to fragmented reporting, and further create
inefficient externalities.
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Second, Reporting: He indicated that there are concerns about how much
information is collected by the government. Currently, the tax authorities demand
compendious information, which creates inefficiency.
Third, Collections of tax: He averred that the frequency of collection of taxes
should, in order to reduce compliance costs, be kept low. Moreover, there should
be no need for separate payments through different recovery agents, as is the
case currently.
Fourth, Processing of tax returns: He suggested that tax returns should not be
processed by multiple authorities but only under the aegis of a single, centralised
authority.
Fifth, Refund: He emphasised the need to resolve the issue of refunds. Under
the current model, the process is byzantine. Citing the example of Australia,
where the average time taken to process refunds is 3 days-the corresponding
average in India is 90 days-he averred that this process required urgent steps
toward streamlining, or working capital would continue to be blocked and the
taxpayer would continue to suffer a higher interest burden.
Sixth, Audit: He stressed that the current duality in auditing often led to multiple investigations and consequent wastage of public resources.
Mr. Modi was followed by Mr. Hiregange who started by explaining that indirect taxation was tied with procedure, which permits unnecessary intervention by
administrators.
He identified certain key issues with respect to registration under the proposed
GST regime. He first explained that in order to motivate taxpayers to register, the
registration process would have to be further simplified. He also pointed out that
while the GST mandates registration and that customers will not get credit should
this not be done, the Supreme Court has in the past held registration to be a mere
procedural formality.
Moving on to the black-listing of dealers, he said that around 10% of tax
payers were non-compliant. If a dealer falls within some margin, he will be
black-listed and this would have a consequent effect on the market. Since the
blacklisting of a dealer would work retrospectively, even his customers would be
hurt. If the supplier defaults the buyer is affected, as he is not given credit. This
domino effect in GST could render it unworkable.
He also raised the concern that in rural areas, accounts are usually made six
months after the year gets over, and the accounting mandates of the GST do not
fully account for such issues.
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The next speaker, Mr. Jatin Christopher, explained expressed the belief that
the duality of administration and procedure in the GST would create hurdles and
reduce compliance levels. He also pointed out that the GST model was flawed
since it depends on the validation of sales by customers. If 20% of one's sale
value is not validated by the customer, then it can put one out of business. He
also alluded to the oppressive levels of information required under the current
system, even while acknowledging the recent stepts taken by the Government to
alleviate this situation.
Mr. Karthik Sundaram, the concluding speaker, discussed the context in which
GST's procedures must be viewed. He explained that since technology and infrastructure would form the backbone of a future GST regime, it carried an infinite
potential of streamlining processes. He also discussed the GST Network's constitution and stated that involving private players would ensure lesser bureaucratic
monopoly over the service, whose main aim is only to give back-end support to
the Government. He emphasised the need to outsource such functions to improve
efficiency.
He also addressed concerns pertaining to data security and privacy. He opined
that there was no definitive right to privacy in the context of taxation and that,
in any event, the right to privacy would have to be balanced against concerns of
public interest. He stated that the Articles of Association of the GSTN adequately
balanced this. They require secrecy and limit the access to data to the government. Withal, the sharing of information would be with regard to business activities, not personal information.
This was followed by a question and answer session. The first question pertained to the need for a GSTN, and it was clarified that a separate GSTN was
required to ensure that experts could be hired at competitive rates to improve the
efficiency of tax administration.
Next, a question was asked about whether the GSTN would be immune to a
leak along the lines of the leak at Mossack Fonseca? Here, the speakers acknowledged that the possibility of such a leak always existed, but clarified that if less
unnecessary information was demanded, then the vulnerabilities at stake would
stand substantially reduced. Moreover, they averred that provision for compensation in this respect should be made.
In response to a question on the overall procedural integrity of the GST,
the speakers emphasised that it was essential to have a good design in the first
attempt as efforts to mobilise consensus around another constitutional amendment
would prove impossible.

